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Making Amends for History: Legislative
Reparations for Japanese Americans and
Other Minority Groups
Sarah L. Brew*
On August 9, 1988, in order "to right a grave wrong,"' Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan signed the Civil Liberties Act of 1988,2 provid-
ing an apology and restitution to Japanese Americans who were
interned during World War II. As President Reagan noted, this in-
ternment was "without trial and without jury. It was based solely
on race." 3 This article explores the history behind the Civil Liber-
ties Act of 1988 and its implications for other groups who deserve
redress and restitution for governmental violations of their civil
rights. Part I provides a brief historical overview of the intern-
ment of American citizens and resident aliens of Japanese ances-
try and the resulting litigation. Part II describes the circumstances
and debate surrounding the recent renaissance of the reparations
and redress movement. Finally, Part III argues that Native and
African Americans also deserve legislative apologies and monetary
reparations for governmental injustices, but that the economic,
political and social manifestations of past and present discrimina-
tion render the enactment of such legislation unlikely.
I. Inequality and Internment: 1941-1948
Throughout their history in this country, American citizens
of Japanese ancestry have felt the impact of racism and discrimi-
nation.4 Thus, when the United States declared war on Japan on
December 8, 1941, the day after the bombing of Pearl Harbor,
many Japanese Americans foresaw the inevitable-that they
would become targets for both governmental reprisal and vigilante
terrorism. Yet in the early days of 1942, Japanese Americans were
* The author will receive her J.D. from the University of Minnesota in May,
1990.
1. L.A. Times, Aug. 11, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
2. 50 U.S.C. App. § 1989.
3. L.A. Times, Aug. 11, 1988, at 16, col. 1.
4. See generally Frank Chuman, The Bamboo People: The Law and Japanese-
Americans chs. 2-7 (1976); Bill Hosokawa, JACL in Quest of Justice ch. 1 (1982);
Peter Irons, Justice At War 9-13 (1983).
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largely ignored by the military as intelligence reports concluded
that Japanese Americans and resident aliens, despite their large
concentration on the Pacific Coast, presented no real threat to the
security of the western United States.5 In addition, the press
helped calm potential public hostility by editorializing in favor of
tolerance and understanding.6
Within weeks, however, public opinion was dramatically re-
versed. As headlines announced victory after victory for the Japa-
nese in the Pacific, the press began to fuel the pervasive anti-Asian
sentiment on the West Coast. For example, accounts of actual Jap-
anese shelling off the coast near Santa Barbara, California were
followed by dozens of false reports of local Japanese Americans
signaling the enemy from shore.7 In this atmosphere of increasing
suspicion and hostility towards Japanese Americans, radio com-
mentators and journalists, ranging from Walter Lippman to West-
brook Pegler, urged mass evacuation of all Japanese citizens and
aliens.8
Various West Coast organizations such as American Legion
posts in Washington, Oregon and California joined in the clamor to
round up and imprison Japanese Americans. Federal Post 97 in
Portland, Oregon demanded that all people of Japanese ancestry
be relocated at least 300 miles inland.9 Labor Unions such as the
Grower-Shipper Vegetable Association and the California Farm
Bureau also agitated for the removal of the ethnic Japanese, their
main economic competitors.10 Even a majority of the members of
5. Irons, supra note 4, at 6-7.
6. Id.
7. Donald Collins, Native American Aliens 14 (1985).
8. Although Lippman, a liberal, intellectually respected columnist, and Pegler,
a right-wing commentator, both supported the same end, the means by which they
justified it were quite different. Lippman's concern over constitutional rights led
him to propose a system of internment that would compel all persons in a military
zone to prove a good reason to be there. Under that system, he argued: "[a]ll per-
sons are in principle treated alike." Commission on Wartime Relocation and In-
ternment of Civilians, Personal Justice Denied 80 (1982) [hereinafter Report].
Pegler, on the other hand, stated:
We are so dumb and considerate of the minute constitutional rights...
of people whom we have every reason to anticipate with preventive ac-
tion! ... The Japanese in California should be under armed guard to
the last man and woman right now and to hell with habeas corpus un-
til the danger is over.
Id. See also Chuman, supra note 4, at 148-49.
9. Morton Grodzins, Americans Betrayed: Politics and the Japanese Evacua-
tion 42-43 (1949).
10. The Grower-Shipper Vegetable Association blatantly admitted the signifi-
cant economic motivation behind forcing Japanese American farmers off their land
and into camps:
We're charged with wanting to get rid of the Japs for selfish reasons.
We might as well be honest. We do. It's a question of whether the
[Vol. 8:179
1989] REPARATIONS FOR JAPANESE AMERICANS 181
the Northern California Civil Liberties Union favored
evacuation."
West Coast political leaders responded swiftly to these con-
cerns.12 Earl Warren,13 then Attorney General of California, testi-
fied before a Congressional committee studying evacuation and
urged immediate evacuation of all Japanese Americans and resi-
dent aliens.14 Most West Coast members of Congress expressed
similar views.' 5 For example, Representative John Z. Anderson
not only favored internment, but also proposed a constitutional
amendment providing that persons whose parents were ineligible
for citizenship should not become citizens merely by birth in the
United States.16
Despite this intense pressure to evacuate Japanese Ameri-
cans, Attorney General Francis Biddle and the Justice Department
opposed such drastic measures. 17 Biddle and the Justice Depart-
ment conceded that resident aliens should not have access to cer-
tain restricted areas, but they saw no military justification for a
mass relocation of citizens and aliens of Japanese heritage.' 8 Their
position was based upon the analysis of J. Edgar Hoover, Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Hoover asserted that the
political pressure for mass evacuation sprang from public hysteria
and comments by the media rather than from actual military
necessity.19
The Army responded by creating a "military necessity" for
relocating Japanese Americans. In early 1942, Lieutenant General
John L. DeWitt, Commander of West Coast defense, submitted a
report to the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson.20 In his report,
DeWitt declared that Americans of Japanese descent must be
evacuated and interned, as a military necessity, since their distinc-
white man lives on the Pacific Coast or the brown man. They came
into this valley to work, and they stayed to take over.... If all the
Japs were removed tomorrow, we'd never miss them in two weeks, be-
cause the white farmers can take over and produce everything the Jap
grows. And we don't want them back when the war ends, either.
Report, supra note 8, at 69.
11. Id.
12. Id at 69-71.
13. Warren later regretted his involvement in the internment process. See Jack
Harrison Pollack, Earl Warren: The Judge Who Changed America 364 (1979).
14. Chuman, supra note 4, at 150-51.
15. Report, supra note 8, at 70; see also Grodzins, supra note 9, at 64-65.
16. Chuman, supra note 4, at 149.
17. Report, supra note 8, at 72-73.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 73.
20. U.S. Department of War, Final Report: Japanese Evacuation From the West
Coast, 1942 (1943) [hereinafter Final Report].
Law and Inequality [Vol. 8:179
tive racial characteristics predisposed them to disloyalty, sabotage
and espionage. 2 ' In reaching this conclusion, DeWitt ignored FBI
and naval intelligence reports concluding that Japanese Americans
posed no real threat to national security.22 Instead, DeWitt based
his findings on his own racial prejudices23 and the undocumented
accusations of West Coast political leaders such as Earl Warren.24
Nonetheless, the Report convinced Secretary Stimson that re-
moval and relocation of Japanese Americans was urgent, and he in
turn persuaded President Franklin D. Roosevelt.25
On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive
Order 906626 authorizing Stimson to designate military areas "from
which any or all persons may be excluded." 27 After Congress rati-
fied the order,28 a three-part evacuation plan was implemented.
First, persons of Japanese ancestry were excluded from all desig-
nated military areas.29 Second, they were placed under curfew at
home from 8:00 p.m. until 6:00 a.m. 30 Third, they were relocated in
concentration camps, 31 euphemistically referred to as relocation
centers, for an indefinite period of confinement. 32 By late 1942,
119,000 Japanese Americans were behind barbed wire in ten in-
21. Id. at 33-37.
22. Irons, supra note 4, at 280-81 (discussing FBI report); id, at 202-03 (discuss-
ing naval intelligence report).
23. The Report's overt racism is exemplified by statements such as the
following:
In the war in which we are now engaged, racial affinities are not sev-
ered by migration. The Japanese race is an enemy race and while
many second and third generation Japanese born on United States
soil, possessed of United States citizenship, have become "American-
ized", the racial strains are undiluted.... That Japan is allied with
Germany and Italy in this struggle is not ground for assuming that any
Japanese, barred from assimilation by convention as he is, though born
and raised in the United States, will not turn against this nation when
the final test of loyalty comes. It, therefore, follows that along the vi-
tal Pacific Coast over 112,000 potential enemies, of Japanese extrac-
tion, are at large today.
Final Report, supra note 20, at 34.
24. Report, supra note 8, at 90.
25. Irons, supra note 4, at 56-63.
26. Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1968).
27. These areas included "zones around airports, dams, powerplants, pumping
stations, harbor areas and military installations." Report, supra note 8, at 72.
28. Act of March 21, 1942, ch. 191, 56 Stat. 173 (repealed 1976).
29. Report, supra note 8, at 100-01.
30. Id. at 101.
31. For detailed descriptions of the harsh physical and psychological conditions
of the camps, see Paul Bailey, Concentration Camp, U.S.A. (1972); Roger Daniels,
Concentration Camps USA (1972); Anne Reeploeg Fisher, Exile of a Race (1965);
Dillon Myer, Uprooted Americans (1971). See also Chuman, supra note 4, at 144-45;
Irons, supra note 4, at 73-74.
32. Report, supra note 8, at 185.
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ternment camps throughout the interior of the United States.33
Most would remain interned for an average of thirty months.3 4
This policy of exclusion, removal and detention was carried
out without individual review, and prolonged internment contin-
ued despite the fact that no documented acts of espionage, sabo-
tage or unloyal activity were shown to have been committed by
any person of Japanese ancestry. 35 Congress, fully aware of the
policy of removal and detention, supported it by enacting a federal
statute that criminalized the violation of orders issued pursuant to
Executive Order 9066.36
In 1943, three cases were brought before the United States
Supreme Court to test the constitutionality of the three aspects of
the military exclusion plan-the curfew, the evacuation and the
internment. 37  The first case, Hirabayashi v. United States,3 8
presented the question of whether the curfew restriction unconsti-
tutionally discriminated between citizens of Japanese ancestry and
those of other ancestries in violation of the fifth amendment.3 9
Although the Court acknowledged the hardships imposed by the
exclusion order on Japanese Americans, it unanimously affirmed
the validity of the restriction. The Court relied on the fact that
the nation was at war and accepted the idea that residents with an-
cestors from the invading nation may possess dangerous "ethnic
33. The camps' locations and the number of people they housed are as follows:
1. Manzanar, California 10,000
2. Tule Lake, California 16,000
3. Poston, Arizona 20,000
4. Gila River, Arizona 15,000
5. Minidoka, Idaho 10,000
6. Heart Mountain, Wyoming 10,000
7. Granada, Colorado 8,000
8. Topaz, Utah 10,000
9. Rohrer, Arkansas 10,000
10. Jerome, Arkansas 10,000
Chuman, supra note 4, at 144.
34. Irons, supra note 4, at 74.
35. Chuman, supra note 4, at 147.
36. Act of Mar. 21, 1942, Pub. L. No. 503 (repealed 1976).
37. Litigation was not the only means by which Japanese Americans responded
to these injustices. By March 17, 1945, the Attorney General had accepted 5,589 re-
nunciations of citizenship from Americans of Japanese descent. All of the renunci-
ations came from people in relocation centers-5,461 from Tule Lake, and the
remaining 128 from eight other relocation centers. Most of these renunciants later
had their citizenship restored, but only after a twenty-two-year legal battle. See
Collins, supra note 7, at 101.
38. 320 U.S. 81 (1943). Hirabayashi's conviction was vacated in Federal District
Court in 1986. 627 F. Supp. 1445 (W.D. Wash. 1986), aff'd, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir.
1987).
39. The fifth amendment provides that "No person shall be... deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .. " U.S. Const. amend. V.
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affiliations."40
In the second case, Korematsu v. United States,41 the Court
upheld the constitutionality of the evacuation order in a 6 to 3 de-
cision.42 Relying entirely and without question on the "facts" es-
tablishing "military necessity" in DeWitt's Final Report,43 the
Court deferred to military judgment and denied any implication of
racial discrimination.44
On the same day the Korematsu case was decided, the Court
also considered a third case, Ex Parte Endo,4S which tested the va-
lidity of the internment order. The Court unanimously held that
the continuing internment of a citizen whose loyalty had been de-
termined46 was prohibited. It did so, however, on extremely nar-
row grounds-that the detention was not authorized by Congress
40. The court explained its reasoning as follows:
We cannot say that these facts and circumstances, considered in the
particular war setting, could afford no ground for differentiating citi-
zens of Japanese ancestry from other groups in the United States....
... We cannot close our eyes to the fact, demonstrated by experi-
ence, that in time of war residents having ethnic affiliations with an
invading enemy may be a greater source of danger than those of a dif-
ferent ancestry.
320 U.S. at 101 (Stone, J.).
41. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Korematsu's 1942 conviction was vacated in 1984. 584 F.
Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
42. Dissenting opinions were filed by Justices Owen Roberts, 323 U.S. 214, 225;
Frank Murphy, 323 U.S. 214, 233; and Robert Jackson, 323 U.S. 214, 242. All three
justices argued that the evacuation order went beyond the constitutional boundary
of military authority and was clearly racist.
43. Justice Frank Murphy's dissenting opinion criticized the overt racism in the
Final Report and quoted DeWitt's remarks made before a congressional committee:
"I don't want any of them here. They are a dangerous element.... It makes no
difference whether he is an American citizen, he is still a Japanese. . .. [W]e must
worry about the Japanese all the time until he is wiped off the map." 323 U.S. 214,
236 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
44. To cast this case into outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to
the real military dangers which were presented, merely confuses the
issue. Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of
hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war
with the Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted military
authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and. . .decided that
the military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Jap-
anese ancestry be segregated from the West Coast temporarily.
Id. at 223.
45. 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
46. Mitsuye Endo applied to leave the Tale Lake Relocation Center. The War
Relocation Authority [hereinafter WRA] reviewed her application and determined
that she was a loyal, law-abiding citizen. However, after making this determina-
tion, the WRA kept her detained for an additional period so that the relocation pro-
cess could be planned and orderly. Id. at 292-97. She then filed a writ of habeas
corpus, alleging that she was a loyal citizen, that no charges had been brought
against her, and that she was confined in the relocation center against her will. Id.
at 294.
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or by an explicit executive order.47
The day before the Supreme Court announced its decisions in
Korematsu and Endo, the War Department issued a press release
announcing the revocation of the exclusion order.48 In December
of 1944, the War Relocation Authority, the civilian agency that
oversaw the camps, declared that the camps would be closed and
emptied by late 1945, regardless of the progress of the war.49 At
the time of this announcement only about 80,000 Japanese Ameri-
cans, mostly young and elderly, remained interned.5 0 During the
course of the war, approximately 30,000 Japanese Americans had
left the camps to join the Army, attend school or work in the sur-
rounding areas.51 These internees were permitted to leave only af-
ter the War Relocation Authority conducted a loyalty review.52
Releasing the remaining internees, however, proved much more
complicated and time-consuming than the original round-up. Both
bureaucratic red tape and the absence of homes and businesses to
which the internees could return forced many Japanese Ameri-
cans to leave the camps only to be temporarily housed in hostels
throughout the West Coast.53
Even before their release from the internment camps, many
Japanese Americans began arguing for official recognition that
they were the victims of a mass injustice and demanded adequate
reparations.5 4 After the war, the Japanese American Citizens
League (JACL) lobbied intensely and successfully for the passage
of the Japanese-American Evacuation Claims Act on July 2,
1948.55 Under this Act, internees were given until January 3, 1950
to file claims for lost property, but not for lost income or for pain
and suffering. To expediate the payment of claims, the Attorney
General was allowed to pay a "compromise" settlement consisting
of three-fourths of the amount of a valid claim or $2,500, which-
ever was less.56 While Japanese Americans welcomed Congress'
recognition of their right to compensation for a wrong, and over
$37 million was eventually distributed, these payments were woe-
fully inadequate.57 Many Japanese Americans did not file claims
47. Id. at 297-300.
48. Irons, supra note 4, at 345.
49. Report, supra note 8, at 234-36.
50. Hosokawa, supra note 4, at 269.
51. Id.
52. Report, supra note 8, at 190-92.
53. Hosokawa, supra note 4, at 270-71.
54. Id. at 343.
55. 50 U.S.C. App. § 1981.
56. Id. See also Report, supra note 8, at 120 and n.14.
57. Report, supra note 8, at 121.
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because they lacked the necessary documentation of loss.s5 Those
who did file received "compromise" settlements that amounted to
10 cents for every dollar lost.59 Furthermore, these payments in
no way compensated for the loss of time, dignity and liberty Japa-
nese Americans suffered while they were imprisoned.
II. The Redress and Reparations Movement: 1978-1988
After they were released from the camps, most internees de-
voted their time and energy to rebuilding their lives and thus had
little interest in discussing the issue of more substantial repara-
tions.6 0 Yet a few Japanese Americans continued to strive for rec-
ognition of the injustice of internment and for adequate
compensation. 61 As early as 1946, the JACL began discussing the
reparations issue at their annual conventions.6 2 However, a cohe-
sive reparations and redress movement did not gain force until
nearly three decades later as younger Japanese Americans, who
gained second-hand experience of the camps from the stories of
parents and grandparents, became convinced of the need for resti-
tution.63 One branch of the movement persuaded Representaive
Michael Lowry (D-WA) to introduce a bill64 providing direct mon-
etary compensation to those who had been interned or their
heirs.65 The more conservative JACL correctly predicted that
Lowry's bill was too extreme to gain broad political support. The
JACL instead supported more moderate legislation establishing a
commission to determine first whether any wrong was committed
against Japanese Americans by Executive Order 9066 before any
consideration would be given to reparations. 66 Supported by
58. Hosokawa, supra note 4, at 290.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 343-44.
61. Some internees sought redress through the courts. See, e.g., Hohri v. U.S.,
586 F. Supp. 769 (D. D.C. 1984) (applicable statute of limitations barred damage
claims brought by Japanese Americans interned during World War II), off'd in
part and rev'd in part, 782 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, en banc, 793 F.2d
304 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated, 482 U.S. 64 (1987), on remand, 847 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (affirming District Court's dismissal of claims by internees under applicable
statute of limitations), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 307 (1988); see also Case Comment,
Sovereign Immunity: Hohri v. United States, 55 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1068 (1987)(au-
thored by Glenn Harris).
62. Hosokawa, supra note 4, at 343.
63. Id., at 344.
64. H.R. 5977, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 Cong. Rec. 33966 (1979). Entitled
"World War II Japanese American Human Rights Violation Redress Act," this bill
directed the Justice Department to locate all internees, determine the length of
their internment, and pay each $15,000 plus $15 per day of internment.
65. Irons, supra note 4, at 348.
66. Id.
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House majority leader James Wright (D-TX)67 and Senator Daniel
Inouye (D-HI),68 this legislation was approved by Congress on July
31, 1980.69
The nine-person Commission on Wartime Relocation and In-
ternment of Civilians70 was established with the following Con-
gressional mandate: 1) to review the facts and circumstances
surrounding Executive Order 9066 and the impact of the Order on
citizens and resident aliens of Japanese descent; 2) to review the
directives of military officials requiring the relocation and deten-
tion of American citizens; and 3) to recommend appropriate reme-
dies.71 To fulfill this directive, the Commission heard testimony
from over 750 evacuees, government officials, public figures, his-
torians and others. The Commission also made an extensive re-
view of documents and records relating to the internment of
Japanese American citizens.72
In February of 1983, the Commission submitted a unanimous
67. H.R. 5499, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 Cong. Rec. 26884 (1979).
68. S. 1647, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 Cong. Rec. 22333 (1979).
69. Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians Act, Pub.
L. No. 96-317, 94 Stat. 964 (1980).
70. Chaired by Joan Bernstein, a Washington attorney and former Carter ad-
ministration official, the Commission included former Supreme Court Justice Ar-
thur Goldberg; two former Massachusetts representatives, Senator Edward Brooke
and Representative Robert Drinan; California Representative Daniel Lungren; for-
mer Washington Senator Hugh Mitchell; Arthur Flemming, chair of the U.S. Civil
Rights Commission; and Ishmael Gromoff, a Russian Orthodox priest from Alaska.
Hosokawa, supra note 4, at 352-53. The only Japanese American member was Phil-
adelphia Judge William Marutani, who had been interned as a teenager. Id.
71. Congress also directed the Commission to examine the treatment of the
Aleuts, who were evacuated during World War II when the Japanese attacked the
Aleutian Islands. The Commission found that, unlike the internment of Japanese
Americans, the evacuation of the Aleuts was not motivated by racism but by con-
cern for the safety of the Aleuts. See Report, supra note 8, at 323-25. Still, the
Commission recommended that Congress pay each surviving Aleut $5,000 and pay
for removing debris and repairing damage on the Aleutian Islands. Commission on
Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, Personal Justice Denied, Part 2:
Recommendations 11-12 (1983) [hereinafter Recommendations]. See also Report,
supra note 8, at 317-59. These recommendations were substantially enacted in the
Civil Liberties Act of 1988. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. App. § 1989C-5 (authorizing payment
of $12,000 to each eligible Aleut); 50 U.S.C. App. § 1989C-6 (authorizing the Aleu-
tian Island restitution program). In addition to individual payments to Aleuts, rep-
aration funds may also be used for:
(A) the benefit of elderly, disabled or seriously ill persons on the ba-
sis of special need;
(B) the benefit of students in need of scholarship assistance;
(C) the preservation of Aleut cultural heritage and historical records;
(D) the improvement of community centers in affected Aleut vil-
lages; and
(E) other purposes to improve the condition of Aleut life, as deter-
mined by the trustees.
50 U.S.C. App. § 1989C-4(c)(2).
72. Report, supra note 8, at 1-2.
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report to Congress, detailing the history and circumstances sur-
rounding Executive Order 9066. The report concluded that Execu-
tive Order 9066 was not based on military necessity, but rather on
racism, war hysteria and the failure of political leadership.7 3 As a
result, "[a] grave personal injustice was done to the American citi-
zens and resident aliens of Japanese ancestry who, without indi-
vidual review or any probative evidence against them, were
excluded, removed and detained....
From these conclusions, the Commission recommended that
Congress pass a legislative apology recognizing the injustice of the
internment program and that the president pardon all persons
convicted of either curfew violations or refusal to accept discrimi-
natory treatment.75 The Commission also recommended that ex-
ecutive agencies liberally review applications by Japanese
Americans for restitution for positions, status or entitlements lost
as a consequence of wartime detention.76 The Commission further
urged that Congress establish a special foundation to fund educa-
tion about and research into the causes and effects of discrimina-
tion against Japanese Americans during World War II and of
racism and discrimination in general.77 Finally, and most impor-
tantly, the Commission recommended that Congress appropriate
$1.5 billion to provide per capita compensatory payments of $20,000
to each surviving internee and to fund the research and educa-
tional activities above.78
Shortly after the Commission released its findings and rec-
ommendations, bills were introduced in Congress to implement
some or all of these recommendations. 79 These bills languished
within the legislative machinery for four years before final ver-
sions of the Commission's recommendations were introduced into
the Senate as S. 100980 and into the House of Representatives as
73. Recommendations, supra note 71, at 5.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 8.
76. Id. at 8-9.
77. Id. at 9.
78. Id. at 9-10.
79. See, e.g., H.R. 4110, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 Cong. Rec. H8193 (daily ed.
Oct. 6, 1983) and S. 2116, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 Cong. Rec. S16606 (daily ed. Nov.
17, 1983) (conforming exactly to the Commission's recommendations); H.R. 3387,
98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 Cong. Rec. H4329 (daily ed. June 22, 1983) (differing from
the Commission's recommendations by advocating compensation for both surviving
victims and heirs of deceased victims); S. 1520 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 Cong. Rec.
S8915 (daily ed. June 22, 1983) (proposing compensation, but without specifying a
formula).
80. S. 1009, 100th Cong., ist Sess., 133 Cong. Rec. S5156 (daily ed. April 10,
1987). Sen. Spark Matsunaga (D-HI) drafted this legislation, and he, along with 70
of his colleagues, introduced it into the Senate. Id.
[Vol. 8:179
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H.R. 442.81 Although these bills varied slightly, they both con-
tained a formal apology and authorized the creation of a trust fund
from which tax-free payments of $20,000 would be made to each
living internee.8 2 The fund would also finance educational pro-
grams to combat racism.8 3
Most opponents of this legislation, such as Senator Larry
Pressler (R-SD), accepted the Commission's findings but thought
that in an era of increasing debt and deficits, monetary compensa-
tion was unjustified.8 4 Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) also supported
an official apology, but believed that the Japanese-American Evac-
uation Claims Act had already provided adequate compensation to
internees.8 5
Other opponents, however, challenged the very basis of the
81. H.R. 442, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 Cong. Rec. H156 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1987).
The number assigned to the bill was chosen to honor the 442nd regimental combat
team of World War II. Comprised entirely of Japanese Americans, the unit fought
in some of the fiercest campaigns in Europe and was the most decorated unit of its
size in the military history of the United States. Id.
82. About 60,000 people, half of those interned, are eligible for payment. The
right to restitution vests at the time of enactment so that the heirs of those who die
after the legislation passed may receive payment. In 1989, Congress approved fund-
ing of $1.8 million for the Office of Redress Administration (ORA) merely to begin
identifying Japanese Americans for the purpose of making reparation payments.
135 Cong. Rec. H3114 (daily ed. June 23, 1989). As of April 1989, the ORA had con-
tacted over 54,000 persons to verify their identity and the fact that they were in-
terned during World War II. 135 Cong. Rec. H1402 (daily ed. April 26, 1989)
(statement of Rep. Edwards).
83. Congress has yet to provide funding for actual reparation payments or edu-
cational programs. In fact, even the funding of reparations payments remains con-
troversial and uncertain. Although the Commission recommended that $1.5 billion
be appropriated to finance the reparations payments and educational programs,
supra note 78 and accompanying text, the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 authorized
only $500 million in spending on compensation for Japanese Americans for 1990. In
its 1990 budget proposal, the Reagan administration slashed this amount to $20 mil-
lion. The Bush administration likewise proposed only $20 million in its 1990 budget
recommendations. In 1989, the House Appropriations Committee recommended
$250 million in reparations funding, half of the amount authorized by the Civil Lib-
erties Act of 1988, yet over twelve times the amount proposed by the Reagan and
Bush administrations. 135 Cong. Rec. H1397 (daily ed. April 26, 1989) (statement of
Rep. Levine). As Rep. Mel Levine (D-CA) explained:
Unfortunately, despite the broad partisan support demonstrated for
this legislation last session, the Reagan and Bush Administrations
have been reluctant to fund the redress program .... It is urgent that
the redress program be promptly and fully funded .... Many of the
internees are now elderly, and as Congress delays funding, fewer of
the internees will survive to benefit from the redress program. As a
result, in this case justice delayed may truly be justice denied.
Id at H1397-98.
Sen. Matsunaga's office projects that actual payments to internees will begin in
late 1990.
84. 134 Cong. Rec. S11257 (daily ed. Aug. 9, 1988) (statement of Sen. Pressler).
85. 134 Cong. Rec. S5412-13 (daily ed. May 10, 1988) (statement of Sen. Nunn).
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Commission's determinations. For instance, Senator S. I.
Hayakawa (D-CA) argued that the detention of his fellow Japa-
nese American citizens was neither a mistake nor an injustice in
light of the exigency of war.8 6 Instead, he contended, the intern-
ment actually benefited Japanese Americans, providing them with
jobs and education and teaching them self-reliance; therefore, any
apology would be inappropriate.8 7 Still more opposition to the
need for any apology was brought on behalf of veterans' groups,
especially World War II prisoners of war,8 8 who urged that until
American prisoners received an apology and compensation from
Japan, none should be given to American citizens of Japanese
descent.8 9
In response to these objections, supporters of the legislation
emphasized the Commission's findings and fundamental American
values. Senator Spark Matsunaga (D-HI), for example, pointed out
that "compensatory remedies," not mere apologies, "are deeply
rooted in American jurisprudence" therefore, as victims of false
imprisonment, Japanese Americans should be awarded damages
for pain and suffering, mental anguish, and perhaps even punitive
damages. 90 Matsunaga further argued that while the Japanese-
American Evacuation Claims Act nominally compensated intern-
86. 134 Cong. Rec. S11257-60 (daily ed. Aug. 9, 1988) (statement of Sen. Pressler
quoting Sen. Hayakawa).
87. L.A. Times, Apr. 29, 1986, at 5, col. 1.
88. For instance, a former United States government employee, assigned to the
Philippines during World War II, made the following complaint:
Having been a prisoner of the Japanese during World War II for three
years and two months, I wrote our two California senators suggesting
the U.S. pay us $20,000 for our time of internment along with the pay-
ments to the American Japanese interned here. We received $2 a day
for our "relocation" in four camps.... Perhaps now that.. . Japanese
are so affluent they might like to pay us.
L.A. Times, Sept. 29, 1988, at 6, col. 4.
89. Rep. Helen Bentley (R-MD) explained the reason behind her vote as
follows:
[L]ast night when I arrived home, my husband, who served in the
Army during the Korean War, came into the kitchen shaking his head
and muttering, "If you want a fast divorce, you vote for that outra-
geous expenditure of our money."
... [H]e had been watching C-SPAN and had heard the floor de-
bate concerning the reparations for those persons who had been incar-
cerated during World War II.
"That was wartime," he shouted, "and we did not start the war. If
anyone should get anything, it should be the American prisoners who
were treated cruelly and frequently tortured .... "
134 Cong. Rec. H6309 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1988) (statement of Rep. Bentley).
90. 134 Cong. Rec. S4270 (daily ed. April 19, 1988) (statement of Sen. Mat-
sunaga). Sen. Matsunaga submitted as exhibits sixteen cases in which victims of
false imprisonment were given substantial damage awards. Id. at S4271-72.
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ees for their documented property losses, the United States has a
moral obligation to make the victims of injury whole, an obligation
that cannot be dismissed by mere budgetary considerations. 91 Pro-
ponents also stressed the moral imperative of correcting a "monu-
mental injustice" and "blatant Constitutional violations." 92  As
U.S. Representative Norman Mineta (D-CA) explained:
This bill is certainly about the specific injuries suffered by a
small group of Americans. But the bill's impact reaches much
deeper, into the very soul of our democracy.
... [T]his legislation touches all of us, because it touches
the very core of our Nation. Does our Constitution indeed pro-
tect all of us, regardless of race or culture? Do our rights truly
remain inalienable, even in times of stress; and especially in
time of stress?
The passage of this legislation answers these questions
with a resounding yes.93
Yet opponents of the reparations and redress legislation also
raised a compelling Constitutional fairness argument. As Senator
Nunn argued during the floor debates:
Those are worthy goals .... but there are other ethnic
groups in this country who have been the victims of Govern-
ment misconduct in the past. In particular American Indians
and American Blacks have cause for complaint against past ac-
tions of our Government. Is it fair to do this for Japanese
Americans and not do the same for other Americans? 94
Opponents also pointed to the economic dimensions of this argu-
ment: compensating Japanese Americans would create a precedent
resulting in the payment of millions of dollars to other groups mis-
treated by the United States government. 95 The Senate responded
to this concern by amending S. 1009 to include an exclusion of
claims section providing that the Act shall not be construed as rec-
ognizing any claims by "Mexico or any other country or any Indian
tribe" other than Aleutian Indians.96
91. Id. at 54271.
92. 134 Cong. Rec. H6312-13 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1988) (statement of Rep. Mineta).
93. Id. at H6313.
94. Statement of Sen. Nunn, supra note 85, at S5413.
95. The National Governors' Association, for example, refused to endorse the
reparations litigation because of its high cost in terms of both payments to Japanese
Americans and possible future reparations to other minority groups. Christian Sci-
ence Monitor, Midwestern Edition, Aug. 5, 1983, at 16.
96. Amendment No. 1969, 134 Cong. Rec. S4397 (daily ed. April 20, 1988). This
amendment was drafted by Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC), who unsuccessfully at-
tempted to weaken the bill with other amendments, including one that would not
allow funds for reparations to be appropriated "until the government of Japan has
fairly compensated the families of the men and women who were killed as a result
of the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor .... Proposed Amendment No. 1971, 134
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On September 14, 1987, the House passed H.R. 442 by a vote
of 243-141,97 and on April 11, 1988, the Senate passed S. 1009 by a
91-4 vote.9 8 Although H.R. 442 lacked an exclusion of claims sec-
tion, the House agreed to the Senate amendment in the conference
committee,99 and this language was incorporated into the final ver-
sion of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 that President Reagan
signed into law on August 9, 1988.100
III. Racism and Reparations: Can Other Minority Groups Gain
Redress?
Although there is no doubt that Japanese Americans suffered
a massive injustice at the hands of the United States government
during World War II, the Congressional debate surrounding the
Civil Liberties Act of 1988 suggests that the controversy over repa-
rations for governmental acts of discrimination will continue. As
Congress anticipated, a few members of other minority groups
have followed the precedent the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 created
and are demanding reparations for past mistreatment. 101 Native
and African Americans clearly deserve redress and reparations for
decades of governmental discrimination and denial of their funda-
mental rights, and a legislative program of reparations would ben-
efit minority groups and society as a whole. Unfortunately, the
lingering economic, political and social effects of past and present
discrimination against these groups make the enactment of such
legislation unlikely.
Spurred by the passage of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988,
Woodrow Bussey, a Cherokee Indian, recently filed suit in Federal
District Court seeking reparations on behalf of his ancestors who
suffered through the forced march known as the Trail of Tears. 0 2
Cong. Rec. S4397 (daily ed. April 20, 1988). Amendment No. 1969 was incorporated
into the bill, which became the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383,
(1988) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1989). Amendment No. 1969 appears at § 301, 102
Stat. 903, 916 (1988) (50 U.S.C. § 1989d).
97. 133 Cong. Rec. H7559 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1987).
98. 133 Cong. Rec. S4322 (daily ed. April 20, 1988).
99. The Senate passed the Conference Committee Report on July 26, 1988, 134
Cong. Rec. S10151, S10153 (daily ed. July 27, 1988); and the House passed the Re-
port on Aug. 4, 1988, 134 Cong. Rec. H6312, H6314 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1988).
100. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (1988) (codified
at 50 U.S.C. § 1989). President Reagan, who originally opposed legislative repara-
tions for Japanese Americans, commented as he signed the Act, "No payment can
make up for those lost years. So what is important in this bill has less to do with
property than honor, for here, we admit a wrong. Here we reaffirm our commit-
ment as a nation to equal justice under the law." L.A. Times, Aug. 11, 1988, at 1,
col. 1. This reasoning could easily apply to reparations for other minority groups.
101. See infra notes 102-03.
102. L.A. Times, Aug. 7, 1988, at 2, col. 5. In order to clear the way for west-
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Likewise, U.S. Representative John Conyers (D-MI) will soon in-
troduce legislation to acknowledge the fundamental injustices of
slavery, to establish a commission to examine the impact of slavery
and subsequent discrimination against African Americans, and to
assess the appropriateness of reparations. 0 3 Both of these de-
ward-pushing settlers, the United States implemented a policy of "removing" sev-
eral Native American tribes. During the early part of the 19th century, the
Choctaw, Creek, Chicasaw and Seminole tribes were all removed from their ances-
tral homelands surrounding the Appalachian Mountains. The Cherokee, a tribe
which had by the 1820s established a written constitution modeled after the United
States Constitution, a newspaper, schools and several industries, resisted removal.
They appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and in 1831 Chief Justice John
Marshall handed down an opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1,
16-17 (1831), declaring that the Cherokee were a "domestic dependent nation." The
following year, in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), the Court ruled
that the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction over the Cherokee. Re-
sponding to pressure from the state of Georgia, President Andrew Jackson ordered
federal troops to evict all Cherokee Indians from Georgia in 1838. Accompanied by
armed troops, the Cherokee were forced to march over 800 miles to Fort Gibson,
Oklahoma. Due to harsh weather and poor government planning, over 4,000 Cher-
okees died during the march, earning it the name "Trail of Tears." See, e.g., Thur-
man Wilkins, Cherokee Tragedy: The Ridge Family and the Decimation of a People
(2d ed. 1986). For other accounts of the tragic impact of United States policy on
Native Americans, see Dee Alexander Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee
(1970); John Neihardt, Black Elk Speaks (1988 ed.).
103. Salim Muwakkil, Blacks Call for Reparations to Break Shackles of the Past,
In These Times, Oct. 11-17, 1989, at 6. The draft of Rep. Conyer's bill includes the
following section on findings and purposes:
(a) Findings.-The Congress finds that-
(1) approximately 4,000,000 Africans and their descendants were
enslaved in [North America] from 1619 to 1865;
(2) the institution of slavery was constitutionally and statutorily
sanctioned by the Government of the United States from 1789 through
1865;
(3) the slavery that flourished in the United States constituted
an immoral and inhumane deprivation of Africans' life, liberty and
cultural heritage, and denied them the fruits of their own labor; and
(4) sufficient inquiry has not been made into the effects of the
institution of slavery on living African Americans and American
society.
(b) Purpose.-the purpose of this Act is to establish a commission
to-
(1) examine the institution of slavery which existed from 1619
through 1865 within the United States and the colonies that became
the United States, including the extent to which the Federal and State
governments constitutionally and statutorily supported the institution
of slavery;
(2) examine de jure and de facto discrimination against freed
slaves and their descendants from the end of the Civil War to the pres-
ent;
(3) examine the lingering negative affects [sic] of the institution
of slavery and the discrimination described in paragraph (2) on living
African Americans and on American society;
(4) recommend appropriate ways to educate the American public
of the Commission's findings;
(5) recommend appropriate remedies in consideration of the
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mands for reparations possess considerable merit.
First, in terms of pure economic loss, Native and African
Americans have experienced greater financial harm through gov-
ernmental discrimination than Japanese Americans experienced
during World War II. The internees' property losses of approxi-
mately $400 millionlO4 are small in comparison to the value of Na-
tive American land claimed and taken by the United States,
estimated at more than ninety million acres between the years of
1887 and 1930 alone.1o05 The confiscation of Native American lands
and the erosion of the Indian nations' sovereignty rights continues
to this day.106
Since Americans of African descent were themselves "prop-
erty" for much of this country's history, they had little property to
lose,107 and the impact of state policy and actions on their eco-
Commission's findings on the matters described in paragraphs (1) and
(2); and
(6) submit to the Congress the results of such examination, to-
gether with such recommendations.
Conyers, John. Discussion Draft, May 19, 1989, at 3-4 (on file in the Law and Ine-
quality office).
In addition, William Owens, a Massachusetts state senator introduced a bill in
December of 1988 that would form a commission to negotiate reparation payments
by the state to "people of African descent." Muwakkil, supra, at 6. In April of
1989, the African-American Summit passed a resolution calling for reparations, and
the Detroit City Council unanimously passed legislation urging Congress to estab-
lish a $40 billion education fund for the descendants of slaves. Race: The Price of
Penance, Time, May 8, 1989, at 33.
104. Report, supra note 8, at 120.
105. Derrick Bell, Race, Racism and American Law 68 (1974). However, the
monetary value of confiscated tribal lands pales in comparison to the human costs
that accompanied the conquest and colonization of North America. "Policies of the
Spanish, French, English, and the United States may have reduced the population
of the new world by as many as twenty-five million. Genocide is the modern word
for a long historic experience which is no stranger to the American continent."
Rennard Strickland, Genocide-At-Law: An Historic and Contemporary View of the
Native American Experience, 34 U. Kan. L. Rev. 713, 714 (1986).
106. For instance, in 1987 the federal government moved more than 12,000 Nav-
ajo Indians from land they had occupied for generations so that private developers
could build a multi-million dollar real estate development. Andy Zipser & Jill
Morrison, Developers Made Millions on Quiet Land Grab, The Business Journal-
Phoenix and the Valley of the Sun, Oct. 19, 1987, § 1, at 1. The Navajos are being
relocated to towns bordering their reservation such as Flagstaff, Winslow and Page
and to "New Lands," land where the ground water has been poisoned by radioac-
tive wastes. Id.
107. Richard Burkey, Racial Discrimination and Public Policy in the United
States 16, 20 (1971). In the South, slaves could not own any property except at the
will of their master. Even if their masters consented, slaves were prohibited by law
from owning cattle, horses, hogs, mules, sheep, books, or weapons. They could not
buy liquor, receive gifts, make a will, or inherit anything. Id. at 16. In New York
and Oregon free Blacks were statutorily prohibited from owning land. In New
Jersey free Blacks could not own property of any kind until after the Revolution-
ary War. Id. at 20.
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nomic status is much more difficult to quantify. Yet statistical
techniques, based on median black family income, show that black
families are economically penalized because of their race. 108 These
statistics indicate that slavery, disenfranchisement and segregation
imposed by, or with the help of, the federal government have
shaped the socio-economic position of black Americans today.109
As Justice Thurgood Marshall explained, "the relationship be-
tween [unemployment and poverty statistics] and the history of
unequal treatment afforded the Negro cannot be denied. At every
point from birth to death the impact of the past is reflected in the
still disfavored position of the Negro.""l 0
Second, governmental violation of the human and civil rights
of Native and African Americans has spanned the course of Amer-
ican history, subjecting them to discrimination much earlier and
much longer than Japanese Americans were. For example, while
Japanese Americans were interned from 1942 to 1945, African
Americans were legally disenfranchised from before the American
Revolution'l1 until the passage of the fifteenth amendment in
1865.112 Furthermore, through the use of poll taxes and literacy
tests, African Americans were effectively disenfranchised in south-
ern states' 13 until the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.114
In the words of Representative Major Owens (D-NY), "After sus-
108. In 1973, the median income for a black family was 58% of that for whites,
resulting in an average of $1,430 less in earnings per year than for whites. Charles
Bullock, III & Harrell Rodgers, Jr., Racial Equality in America: In Search of an
Unfulfilled Goal 7 (1975). The statistics have become even bleaker in recent years.
In 1987 the median income for black Americans was 57.1% of that for white Ameri-
cans, a figure lower than any year of the 1970s. The portion of blacks living in pov-
erty, 33%, was three times the rate for whites and was higher than in 1969. Morton
Kondracke, The Two Black Americas, The New Republic, Feb. 6, 1989, at 17-18.
109. Bullock and Rodgers, supra note 108, at 7-8. A direct link also exists be-
tween past racial discrimination and present minority housing conditions, educa-
tion, and physical and psychological health. Id.
110. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 396 (Mar-
shall, J., separate opinion).
111. Burkey, supra note 107, at 17-20. In the South, slaves were not citizens and
could not vote. Free Blacks could vote, but could not testify in court against a
white person. Id. at 17. In the North, free Blacks were not citizens and could not
vote. In New York only, Blacks could vote, but they had to own at least $250 worth
of property. Id. at 19-20.
112. The fifteenth amendment provides that: "The right of citizens of the United
States to vote shall not be abridged by the United States on account of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude." U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 1.
113. Burkey, supra note 107, at 23.
114. 42 U.S.C. § 1971. The Act outlawed "tests and devices" prerequisite to vot-
ing, such as literacy tests. The Voting Rights Act has successfully increased minor-
ity registration, voting and holding office. See, e.g., Harvard Sitkoff, The Struggle
for Black Equality 1954-1980 229-30 (1981); Kenneth Thompson, The Voting Rights
Act and Black Electoral Participation (1982).
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taining unprecedented damages as a people under 200 years of
criminal enslavement, and an additional 100 years of governmental
abuse and neglect, we need and deserve massive reparations.""l 5
Native Americans have likewise been systematically disen-
franchised for much of this country's history. Although the four-
teenth amendment declared that "All persons, born or naturalized
in the United States ... are citizens of the United States .... ,116
the Supreme Court held that this language did not apply to Native
Americans who were born as members of an Indian tribe.117 Thus,
Native Americans were not considered United States citizens and
were not given the right to vote until the Dawes Act was passed in
1887.118 As one commentator notes, before compensating Japanese
Americans, "settling [these] older scores should come first."11 9
Third, reparations for Native and African Americans would
be no more difficult to implement than compensation to Japanese
Americans. As in the case of the internees, the amount of com-
pensation would not reflect actual economic loss or mental
anguish, a figure impossible to calculate. Instead, the payments
would serve as a symbolic gesture, demonstrating the country's
commitment to "set American history straight."120 Critics of repa-
rations for minority groups contend that locating and distributing
relief to individual victims of racism and discrimination would be
impossible.121 However, these critics fail to recognize that past and
present discrimination are inseparable. They mistakenly assume
that some members of minority groups have escaped the impact of
nearly three centuries of American racism.122 Furthermore, these
critics seem oblivious to the fact that racism and bigotry stem from
assumptions made about groups, not individuals.123 "Thus, the
phenomenon of discrimination has made the group a morally rele-
vant unit and an appropriate subject for compensation."124
115. 135 Cong. Rec. E625 (daily ed. March 2, 1989) (statement of Rep. Owens).
116. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
117. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
118. Dawes Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388-91, Feb. 8, 1887.
119. Robert Gordon, Casualties of History: Making Amends to Japanese-Ameri-
cans, The New Republic, Aug. 15, 1988, at 11.
120. L.A. Times, Mar. 27, 1988, at 5, col. 1 (editorial on reparations to Japanese
Americans).
121. See, e.g., Time supra note 103, at 33; Muwakkil, supra note 103, at 6.
122. See Myrl Duncan, The Future of Affirmative Action: A Jurisprudential/
Legal Critique, 17 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 503, 510-13 (1982).
123. Joel Friedman, Redefining Equality, Discrimination, and Affirmative Ac-
tion Under Title VII: The Access Principle, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 41, 82-85 (1986) (discuss-
ing the administrative convenience of using race as a basis for compensating victims
of discrimination, rather than making individual determinations of victimization).
See also Duncan, supra note 122.
124. Friedman, supra note 123, at 84.
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Accordingly, Congress should authorize reparation payments
to African and Native Americans as groups, rather than individu-
als. Reparation funds could be distributed to Native and African
American community groups, scholarship funds, research projects,
libraries, museums, arts and cultural programs, and similar en-
deavors. The Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment
of Civilians strongly supported this approach to restitution as it re-
lated to Japanese American redress:
The Commissioners all believe a fund for educational
and humanitarian purposes related to the wartime events is
appropriate, and all agree that no fund would be sufficient to
make whole again the lives damaged by the exclusion and de-
tention. The Commissioners agree that such a fund appropri-
ately addresses an injustice suffered by an entire ethnic group,
as distinguished from individual deprivations.12 5
Moreover, group reparations for Native and African Ameri-
cans are especially appropriate as this country enters the 1990s.
Many Americans born after the 1950s are shockingly ignorant of
the civil rights movement and know even less of the conditions
that precipitated that era of our nation's history.126 A national
museum housing artifacts of racism and segregation, such as
"whites only" signs, would help ensure that this shameful part of
our past is not forgotten. 127 In addition, it would expose the his-
torical sources of today's racial discord, perhaps allowing Ameri-
cans to empathize with the issues and problems presently facing
minority groups.
Reparation funds not only could preserve the lessons of the
past, but also could address social issues confronting minority
groups today. For instance, too few people are aware of the seri-
ous impact of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome on the Native American
population.128 A national campaign to promote public understand-
125. Recommendations, supra note 71, at 9.
126. See Jonathan Alter, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Forgetting the Civil Rights
Movement, Newsweek, Jan. 23, 1989, at 52. Alter explains, "[The history of the
civil-rights movement-so central to American history itself-remains hazy in the
public consciousness. Schools, the news media and Hollywood have all fallen short
in bringing it to life. And while [Martin Luther King Jr.'s] birthday has been insti-
tutionalized, his memory is in danger of dimming for the generation born after his
death." Id.
127. In the past few years, the Smithsonian Institute has presented several ex-
hibits focusing on the experience of minority groups in America, including exhibits
on the internment of Japanese Americans, the migration of African Americans to
northern cities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and the contri-
butions of African American inventors, who were often unrecognized and
uncompensated.
128. For a personal account of the tragedy caused by Fetal Alcohol Syndrome
(FAS), see Michael Dorris, The Broken Cord (1989). Dorris argues that FAS "is
the most destructive thing to hit Indians since the European diseases five hundred
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ing of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, funded with reparation money,
would help combat this deadly problem faced not only by Native
Americans, but by all Americans.
Thus, a reparations program based upon group relief would
be a step towards making amends for our past, as well as a means
to improve the present status of traditionally disadvantaged
groups. Additionally, distributing reparation funds to cultural and
educational programs will ensure that future generations will not
forget and, even more important, will not perpetuate the Ameri-
can legacy of discrimination. Despite these clear benefits, such leg-
islation will most likely never be realized due to the very effects of
racism and stereotypes that minority groups are attempting to
overcome.
First, cohesive redress and reparations movements are only
beginning to emerge from the Native and African American popu-
lations.1 29 Individual Japanese Americans and Japanese American
organizations such as the JACL lobbied Congress for reparations
for years, investing inordinate amounts of time and money.130
They drafted the legislation, planned the strategy and mustered
political and public support.'13 However, Native and African
American individuals and organizations cannot engage in compara-
ble tactics because their resources must be allocated between a
multitude of high-priority issues. For instance, Reagan-era cut-
backs in social programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent
Children and Medicaid have had a disproportionately detrimental
effect on traditionally disadvantaged minority groups. 132 As a re-
sult, Native and African American groups have had to devote their
resources to fighting cutbacks and helping those who are no longer
able to obtain adequate food, clothing, housing or health care. i 33
African and Native Americans also have had to spend time and
money protecting the civil rights advancements they made during
the 1960s and 1970s.134 In 1982, for example, minority groups had
to rally to prevent the Reagan administration from undermining
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.135 Thus, because Native and Afri-
years ago." Id. at 158. For a thorough, scientific discussion of the causes and symp-
toms of FAS, see Ernest Abel, Fetal Alcohol Syndrome and Fetal Alcohol Effects
(1984).
129. Jet, Aug. 22, 1988, at 9; Muwakkil, supra note 103, at 6.
130. Hosokawa, supra note 4, at 343-59.
131. Jet, supra note 129, at 9.
132. Alphonso Pinkney, The Myth of Black Progress 173-76 (1984).
133. See id.
134. See id. at 167-79.
135. See Rhoda Lois Blumberg, Civil Rights: The 1960s Freedom Struggle 166
(1984); Pinkney, supra note 132, at 172-73.
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can American organizations must divide their resources between a
variety of pressing issues, they have little time and capital left to
devote to a redress and reparations movement.
Second, redress for Japanese Americans was publicly and po-
litically popular because they are a "model minority."36 As a
group, they are affluent, highly-educated and not perceived, de-
spite their push for reparations, as agitators or militant opponents
of the status quo.137 In fact, the Japanese American experience is
often cited as proof that the American dream of economic success
through hard work and self-help is still obtainable.138 Accord-
ingly, most Americans sympathized with the Japanese American
redress movement and, consequently, politicians were receptive to
reparations legislation.13 9
In contrast, Native and African Americans are haunted by ra-
cist stereotypes and bigoted generalizations. For example, accord-
ing to several studies, African Americans are misperceived as
"superstitious," "lazy," "ignorant."140 In addition, Native and Afri-
can Americans have been unable to achieve the economic success
of Japanese Americans.141 The progress they have made on the
civil rights front has been hard-fought, earning them, unlike Japa-
nese Americans, a reputation of militancy.142 As a result, the pub-
lic, and therefore politicians, probably will not support redress
legislation for African and Native Americans with the same enthu-
siasm they demonstrated for reparations to "model" Japanese
Americans.
136. Report, supra note 8, at 295.
137. Id. In contrast to the economic profile of Black Americans, supra note 108,
the median family income for Japanese Americans is 32 percent higher than the
national average. Thomas Sowell, Ethnic America 177 (1981).
The economic achievements of Japanese Americans today are due pri-
marily to (1) their working more-a higher than average percentage
are in the labor force, a lower than average percentage are unem-
ployed, and a higher proportion of Japanese-American families have
multiple income earners-and to (2) higher than average levels of edu-
cation, combined with a concentration in higher paying scientific and
applied fields.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
138. Anthony Gary Dworkin & Rosalind Dworkin, The Minority Report: An In-
troduction to Racial, Ethnic, & Gender Relations 263 (2d ed. 1982).
139. See Hosokawa, supra note 4, at 358.
140. Gordon Allport, The Nature of Prejudice 198 (1954). In a 1989 poll, 43 per-
cent of white Americans said that economic differences between black and white
Americans occur mainly because Blacks "don't have the motivation or willpower to
pull themselves out of poverty." Richard Morin & Dan Balz, There's Still Room for
Improvement in Racial Relations, Washington Post National Weekly Edition, Oct.
30-Nov. 5, 1989, at 37.
141. See supra notes 108-109.
142. See Allport, supra note 140, at 155 (discussing public perceptions of black
militancy and violence).
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Finally, the fact that Native and African Americans have no
recent, universal symbol of injustice, such as internment, inhibits
their chances for legislative redress. Ironically, the sheer scope
and magnitude of injustices towards African and Native Ameri-
cans deprives them of one single, distinct event behind which they
can unite and to which Americans of European descent can re-
spond.143 For example, while almost every black American has
felt the impact of past discriminatory policies, not all black Ameri-
cans experienced Jim Crow laws in the South during the 1950s.144
Native Americans also remain subject to the lingering effects of
past racist actions, yet not all Native American children were "as-
similated" by being shipped off to boarding school.145 Moreover,
lack of such a symbol prevents African and Native Americans
from gaining broad public support.146 Unlike Japanese Americans,
they have no concrete symbol on which to focus the public spot-
light. The media gave extensive coverage to the Committee's re-
dress hearings, dramatically reminding Americans of the injustice
of the internment camps;147 yet no recent event has encouraged
comparable media attention to the horrors of slavery or the tragic
removal of Native Americans from their ancestral homelands.
IV. Conclusion
Over forty years after they were unfairly imprisoned during
World War II, Japanese Americans finally received justice in the
form of a legislative apology and monetary reparations. Though
there is no doubt that Japanese Americans deserve this compensa-
tion for the wartime abridgement of their civil rights, a great irony
remains: other minority groups, equally deserving of redress for
governmental violations of their civil rights, probably will never be
offered an apology or receive monetary reparations due to the very
discrimination for which they should be compensated. Despite the
many obstacles, Native Americans, African Americans, and other
minority groups should strive for recognition of and compensation
143. See Roger Cobb & Charles Elder, Participation in American Politics: The
Dynamics of Agenda-Building 131-32 (1983). According to Cobb and Elder, "symbol
weight" is important not only in gaining extensive support from members within a
certain group, but also in gaining outside support. The symbol must be appropriate
for both of these elements.
144. In the South, segregation was implemented through Jim Crow laws requir-
ing that Blacks and Whites use separate hospitals, schools, cemeteries, and public
accommodations. Sitkoff, supra note 114, at 5.
145. See James Olson & Raymond Wilson, Native Americans in the Twentieth
Century 60-62, 111-12 (1984).
146. See Cobb & Elder, supra note 143, at 131-32.
147. Hosokawa, supra note 4, at 358.
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for past governmental injustices. Such compensation need not be
given on an individual basis, but instead can be given to minority
educational and cultural programs. After all, it is not so much the
individual recipient or the amount of reparations that is signifi-
cant-what really matters is that, after all these years, we make
amends for our nation's extensive history of governmental
discrimination.

